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IN '!HE SUPREME COOR!' OF THE &TATE OF OTAH 
DENNIS JENKINS, ** 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ** 
vs. ** case No. 18138 
LA WANNA NEWMAN aka 
IA WANNA OLIVER, 
** 
** 
Defendant-Respondent 
** 
BRIEF -QP--DEFENPAm'=RESPONPENl' 
STATEMENr OF THE NATORE OF THE CASE. 
This is an action wherein the Appellant seeks to review the decision of 
Judge Croft, the trial Judge in the Third Judicial District Court, who heard 
the above-entitled matter at the time of its trial on the merits. Judge 
Croft in that action failed to award the Plaintiff-Appellant damages for the 
fair rental value of the residence between the time established for the sale 
pursuant to the contract and the actual closing date on a judgment which 
porports to require specific performance of the contract but in fact allows 
the Plaintiff-Appellant significant modification as to their requiranents for 
the payment of the IXJrchase price for the property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LaIBR COORI' 
The lower court entered a judgment follCMing a hearing on the merits 
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which judgment required the Defendant-Respondent to sell to the 
Plaintiff-Appellant the real property which was the subject matter of the 
litigation subject to the terms and conditions contained in the earnest money 
receipt and offer to purchase which had been executed by the respective 
parties except for the specific provision contained in the earnest money 
receipt and off er to purchase requiring the Plaintiff-Appellant to pay the 
canplete balance in the form of a balloon payment of the second trust deed 
and note which was used and referenced in the earnest money receipt and off er 
to purchase to secure over 3/4 of the total purchase price and more than 3/4 
of the total equity of the Defendant-Respondent's interest in the property. 
Specifically the earnest money receipt and offer to purchase simply required 
the purchaser to pay approximately a $32,000.00 balance on a _$41,000.00 total 
purchase price to the Seller in May of 1982. During the course of the 
hearing on the merits, Judge Croft received testimony pertaining to the 
equity of requiring and not requiring this payment in a timely fonn and chose 
in the lower court to not require strict adherence to the time constraints 
provided in the contract and further chose not to require the Seller, who is 
the Defendant-Respondent in this action, to pay to the Plaintiff-Appellant 
any damages for the loss of rents during the pendency of this action or until 
the time of the closing of the transaction. 
RELIEF SOOGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to obtain damages for the fair rental value of the 
property without redressing the Seller, who is the Defendant-Respondent in 
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this action, for the loss sustained by the Respondent as a result of not 
having the use and benefit of the monies that will becane due her in May of 
1982 according to a strict reading and interrpretation of the contract terms 
and conditions. The Appellant further asserts an entitlement to attorney's 
fees and the Respondent on appeal seeks to avoid the payment of additional 
attorney's fees and avoid the further review of the decision and judgment of 
the trial court and more particularly the setting aside of the trial courts 
decision to prohibit damages for the fair rental value of the property, 
accruing f ran the date of the contracts anticipated closing until the date of 
the contracts actual closing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent through the use of a realtor in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
listed the bane at 1218 Talisman Drive, salt Lake City, Utah, for sale in 
early of 1980 and thereafter received an earnest money receipt and offer to 
purchase through another realtors off ice for the purchase of the subject 
property. 
Following additional negotiations an earnest money receipt and offer to 
purchase was executed by the Respondent and Appellant as seller and purchaser 
respectively. "As the Appellant asserts on page 3, paragraph 2, of their 
brief, the sale agreement provided for what is known as a "balloon paymentn, 
on or before May 31, 1982, or if the Appellant sold the hane whichever should 
first occur, the balloon payment would be due at the time of the sale thereof. 
Pursuant to the Appellant's motion to amend the judgment, Judge Croft amended 
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the original judgment on November 3, 1981, again as the Appellant alleges in 
their brief, not requiring the payment of that balloon payment until two (2) 
years after the sale was canpleted which was and is not strictly and inherence 
to the existing terms and conditions of the contract between the parties. 
Judge Croft as the time of this detennination to delay the responsibility of 
the balloon payment of $32,000.00 on a $41,000.00 sale representing almost 
all of the sellers equity of the property, again chose not to require of the 
seller, who is the Defendant-Respondent the requirement of the payment of the 
rental value of the premises. Judge Croft did not award the Appellant his 
damages for the rental value of the premises during the time the Respondent 
refused to canplete the sale believing that it was inappropriate to extend 
the time for the "balloon payment" and award rental damages as is referenced 
on paragraph 3 of Appellant's brief and is shown on page 64 of the court 
record. All the while, the Appellant is contending that they are entitled to 
specific performance under the contract while seeking to avoid adhearing to 
their obligations and seeking to enforce specific perf orrnance against the 
Defendant-Respondent and avoid the requirements of specific performance for 
the Plaintiff-Appellant. 
AfGJMEm' 
POIN!' 1 
THE PLAINl'IFF-APPELLANI' IS NCJl' ENI'ITLID 'ID 
DAM!-(;E:S EJJUAL 'ID 'IBE FAIR RENTAL VALUE FROM 
THE DATE POSSFBSION SHOOLD HAVE PASSED UNl'IL 
THE TIME OF ACTUAL CLOSnt; ON 'l'BE BASIS '!HAT 
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STRICT SPECIFIC PERFORMAOCE WM ~ RFlJUIRED 
FOR '!HE SALE OF THE RFAL PROPERIY IN QUFSI'ION 
AND FURTHER ON THE BASIS '!HAT IT WAS WITHIN 
THE DISCRE'l'IONARY ADTHORITY OF THE TRIAL 
CCX1RI' 'ID DETERMINE THE NA'IURE AND CONl'ENI' OF 
THE JUDGMENr AND THE APPROPRIATNESS OF 
DAMAGES. 
Disecting point 1 into its logic two sub parts an hereinbef ore 
enumerated, the Resix>ndent argues that the granting of damages for the rental 
value of real property awarded in specific performance cases to a purchaser 
is not a mandatory concept but subject to the discretion of the court which 
discretion was exercised and properly so and which exercise of discretion 
cannot be overturned by the Supreme Court, or should not be overturned by the 
SUprene Court without a clear and unequivical showing of an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. Reviewing this second portion of point 1 
first, the Respondent further argues that the Appellant bears the burden of 
proof in establishing a clear and unequivical abuse of discretion on the part 
of the trial court which the Appellant has failed to sustain. 
The Appellant argues with regards to the first concept covered under 
point 1 that this is in fact not strictly a specific performance case in that 
the Appellant has sought and obtained f ran the trial court relief f ran strict 
adhearence to the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties 
since the Appellant has sought and obtained an extension of considerable 
duration for the payment of the majority of the equity the Seller-Respondent 
in this case was to have obtained for the sale of the real property in 
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question. Specific performance requires both parties to strictly adhere to 
the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties and in this case 
the Appellant has sought the strict performance by the Respondent and has 
sought to avoid strict performance thanselves. 
The case argued in the brief of the Appellant asserts an entitlement to 
damages and the Respondent admits that in certain circumstances damages are 
available and should be granted to successful litigants in specific 
performance cases for the fair rental value of the property during the 
pendency of the litigation prior to the close and taking of possessory 
interest of the subject real property. The Respondent hCMever asserts that 
in this case the court chose to avoid the harsh effect of those damages for 
the benefit of the Respondent and chose to avoid the harsh effect of 
requiring strict perfonnance of the payment of the majority of the money 
required under the terms of the contract for the benefit of the Appellant. 
The argtnnent I have made that the trial court has broad discretionary 
authority in detennination of the propriety of judgments and the structuring 
of judgments is evidenced by cases covering a broad spectrum of topics and 
concepts each evidencing the nature of the course of discretion in the 
granting of judgments, the denying of judgments and the modification of 
judgments. In our case, the Appellant seeks to have the Suprene Court review 
the judgment entered by Judge Croft even after the Appellant has sought an 
order modifying said judgment originally and after Judge Croft has had an 
opportunity of hearing the evidence presented at the time of trial, the 
arguments presented by counsel and the secondary arguments presented by 
counsel in the motion to modify the judgment of the court. Judge Croft• s 
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exercise Of discretion in not granting damages for rentals on the subject 
property is a detriment to the Appellant admittedly but nevertheless 
a valid exercise Of discretion and judgmental authority by the tryer of fact. 
Judge Croft's decision to enforce this specific terms and conditions of the 
contract as contained in the order of the court except for the provision 
pertaining to the "balloon payment" and allowing the "balloon payment" to be 
made two (2) years after the date of closing is again an evidence of the act 
of discretion and authority property within the relm and control of the tryer 
of fact and in this case was exercised to the detriment of the Respondent. 
If specific performance is mandated strictly, Judge Croft would have been 
charged with the responsibility of requiring payment of the balloon payment 
in May of 1982, giving rise to the ci>ligation of the p..irchaser to cane 
foIWard with the $32,000.00 plus required of them within a few short months 
after the entry of the judgment and yet Judge Croft sought to modify the 
harshness of this requirenent by interpreting his authority to grant him the 
leway to modify the specific performance of the contract to that extent while 
requiring of the Respondent-Seller in this case, the requirement of 
nevertheless selling the property and relinquishing title and possessory 
interest. Judge Croft, as the tryer of fact, obviously weighed the benefits 
and burdens, the equities and provisions of law governing the issue of strict 
performance of the contract terms and entitlement of fair rental values for 
the successful litigant and made the detennination as to the appropriate 
award which the Appellant is now contesting again even though the Appellant 
received the substantial benefit of the delay of payments available under 
this use of discretion. For a series of cases evidencing the wide range of 
-7-
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discretionary authority available the trial judge the Respondent refers the 
court to the cases of Mayer-·=v··-Mayer,- 492 P. 2nd 942, a 1972 Supreme Court 
case fran the State of Kansas, and McNeill-v1···-M-len, 534 P. 2nd 813, a 1975 
Appeals court case fran the State of Colorado, and Reese--v,-·::;Geiermann;- 574 P. 
2nd 445, a supreme court case fran the State of Alaska handed down in 1978, 
and Hume::v•--Small:Claims=·=eourt--of::Mttrra;y:€ity;- 590 P. 2nd 309, a 1979 Supreme 
Court, a decision fran the State of Utah, all of which evidence in various 
means and capacities the nature of the broad spectrum of discretionary 
authority in the rendering of judgments and the granting of judgments and 
decisions available to trial courts. All of which sustain the basis 
proposition that the trial court has the authority to weigh the evidence and 
make a detennination based upon law and equity as to the appropriate judgment 
and/or decision to be rendered. 
Further it is the contention of the Appellant that there has been 
established a fair rental value of the property at $265.00 per month. The 
Appellant has asserted in its brief that the Respondent rented the property 
for a period of time and testified as to the rental value. The Appellant 
further asserts that no factual or legal issue exists or is in dispute 
pertaining thereto, but it is the position of the Respondent that in deed in 
factual and legal questions to exist as to the fair rental value, the acts 
engaged in by the Respondent and the necessity of the court awarding damages 
as opposed to the courts discretionary authortity to award damages for the 
fair rental value of the property pending the performance by specific decree 
of the court ordering the same. The Respondent asserts that the Respondent 
_Q_ 
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did not in fact rent the property out but that an agent of a real estate 
canpany whos agency had been prior thereto revoked by the Respondent took it 
upon herself and rented the property during the pendency of this litigation 
and with regards to the $265.00 figure that was the figure that the agent, 
after having had the agency's authority revoked, charged for the property 
and had nothing to do with the Respondent's charges for the property or 
expert testimony pertaining to or even qualified testimony pertaining to the 
fair rental value of the property. It is the position of the Respondent that 
the fair rental value of the property has not been established and that Judge 
Croft during the course of the proceedings, determined that all parties would 
be placed in the best interest by decreeing specific performance on the 
contract subject to the modification allowing the Appellant two (2) additional 
years for all intents and purposes in which to pay off the balloon payment 
required and not awarding the Appellant-Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
matter any damages for the fair rental value on the property during the 
pendency of the litigation. In the case decided by the Utah supreme Court 
entitled Nuttall v. Holman, 173 P. 2nd 1015, the court determined that 
damages for the deprevation of use or the loss of use or rental values could 
not be sustained on the courts individual indulgence and speculation and 
conjtmcture as to the proper values and amounts of damages, losses or 
analagusly, rental receipts. 
It is further the :E:X>Sition of the Respondent that should the supreme 
Court in this review process determine that the laver court has errored in 
the matter of granting damages for the fair rental value of the property 
pending the enforcement of the specific perf onnance of the contract that the 
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SUprane Court should charge the trial court with the obligation of requiring 
a specific performance according to a strict reading of the terms and 
conditions of the existing contract including the requirement of, 
specifically, the payment of the balloon payment required thereunder in May 
of 1982 on that given date as opposed to the granting of a two (2) year tenn 
following the closing as is the existing order for the record appears to 
provide an indication that Judge Croft's determination was that there was an 
appropriate off set and justice would be better served by not granting rental 
damages and by granting a delay for Appellant-Plaintiff's strict performance 
as to the payment of the balloon required under the subject contract. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Respondent asserts that the trial court has not 
abused its discretion in not granting damages for the rental value of the 
property pending the closing of the sale and that the trial court exercised 
its appropriate discretion in off setting this potential relief available to 
the Plaintiff-Appellant, by granting the Plaintiff-Appellant the opportunity 
to avoid the payment of a balloon payment required in May of 1982 setting 
that balloon payment aside for two (2) years follCMing the date of closing of 
the transaction. It is the position of the Respondent that a trial court has 
abroad and effective range of discretion which the Supreme Court should not 
overturn unless a clear and discernable abuse of discretion has been 
established which clear and discernable abuse of discretion has not been 
established by the Appellant. 
-10-
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Respectfully subnitted, 
/ \. 
( \ 1) ) 
. t.~~~~----!~--~±·-t~~·-{-+~-e?f-4'~- - . 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS,!!! 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
MAILIW :CERI'IFICATE 
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Robert Felton 
Attorney at I.aw 
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Salt I.ake City, Utah 84111 
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